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n the 1990s, Americans saved less, but
they became wealthy at an astonishing
rate. What underlies this paradox of a
lower savings rate coupled with increased wealth? As
Leonard Nakamura states in this article, the short
answer is capital gains. Stock-market capital gains are
excluded from our measures of national income, yet
they account for about half of the increase in Ameri-
can households’ net worth in the past two decades.
Nakamura discusses the pros and cons of including
capital gains in national income accounts.
Investing in Intangibles:
Is a Trillion Dollars Missing from GDP?
1 Micawber’s money is in pounds, shillings,
and pence.  There were 20 shillings to a
pound and 12 pence to a shilling.
2 See the article by Richard Peach and
Charles Steindel for an interesting discussion
of this problem and the importance of realized
capital gains (capital gains that investors have
received by selling their investments and,
thus, can be used to pay for consumption).
3  The market value of domestic corporate
equities rose $12 trillion, from $2 trillion at
the end of 1979 to $14 trillion at the end of
2000, in 1996 dollars. During that time, the
total net worth of U.S. households (which
hold almost all of domestic equities) rose $23
trillion, from $15 trillion to $38 trillion. By
contrast, real estate holdings of U.S.
households rose by about $6 trillion during
this period.
4 See the article by Eugene Fama and Kenneth
French.
5 Reports about saving usually focus on
household saving, that is, personal saving.
Personal saving is defined as disposable (that
is, after-tax) personal income less personal
outlays (personal consumption expenditures
plus transfers abroad). Personal income
includes dividends and net interest payments
from corporations, but not capital gains. It
also includes wages and salaries, employment
benefits like health insurance, noncorporate
income such as proprietors’ income and rental
income, and net transfers from government,
such as Social Security benefits.
Writing David Copperfield in
1849, Charles Dickens put these rueful
words into the mouth of the feckless Mr.
Micawber: “Annual income twenty
pounds, annual expenditure nineteen,
nineteen six, result happiness.  Annual
income twenty pounds, annual expendi-
ture twenty ought and six, result
misery.”1 The inability to save leads to
the poorhouse, as Dickens well knew,
since his father’s debts had done just
that to his family. But in the 1990s
Americans saved less and less, according
to official U.S. statistics. Yet far from
being miserable, they became wealthy at
an astonishing rate.
What underlies this paradox of
a small saving rate in tandem with
increased wealth? The short answer is:
capital gains. Specifically, saving and
wealth gains diverge because of a
convention in the U.S. income accounts
that makes a good deal of sense.
Because capital gains are so volatile, the
national income accounts include only
part of investment income: dividends
and interest payments.2 Capital gains
are excluded, yet capital gains from the
stock market have been responsible for
about half of the increase in the net
worth of American households in the
past two decades.3 This rise in capital
gains has occurred because firms can
reward shareholders either with
dividends or with capital gains, and U.S.
corporations have been retaining more
of their earnings in the form of intan-
gible investment and not paying them
out in dividends.4
The official measure of U.S.
household saving, the personal saving
rate, is, like all economic statistics, a
compromise between a theoretical ideal
and the practical limitations of existing
data.5  Ideally, we expect key statistics,
such as the saving rate, real GDP
growth, and consumer price inflation, to
convey important information as clearly28   Q4 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
as possible. In this ideal, a very low
saving rate should not be compatible
with substantial and sustained creation
of wealth.
Let’s look at Mr. Micawber
again. If he has a steady income of 20
pounds a year and no capital assets,
determining his income is simple: 20
pounds. And regular income, such as
paychecks, are generally what our
statistics measure. But what if Micawber
owns some stock? Then measuring his
income is no longer so simple. If his stock
rises in value from 10 pounds to 11
pounds, should Micawber’s income be
calculated as 20 pounds or 21? And how
should Micawber report his income
when his paper profits disappear and
turn into a paper loss? A key question
then for Micawber’s budget problem is:
given that stock prices go up and down,
how much of the gain can he rely on,
and thus, how much can he afford to
spend?
If we include capital gains in
personal saving, the U.S. saving rate,
properly measured, has generally risen
rather than fallen.6 But improving our
statistical measures is by no means
straightforward. Why? Fortunately for
our economic well-being, but unfortu-
nately for the credibility of our statistical
measures, economic activity is increas-
ingly concerned with the creation of
new products. This type of economic
activity is difficult to capture accurately
in our economic measures. In fact, given
how we construct the personal saving
rate for the United States, a low or even
negative saving rate is likely to coexist
with substantially accelerated creation
of wealth.
Shedding some light on this
paradox of diminished saving and
increased wealth and why it’s difficult
to eliminate it is the purpose of this
article.
RESOLVING THE PARADOX
Why did wealth accelerate?
Were we lucky?  Or were we actually
saving more, but miscounting it?  To the
extent that saving was undercounted,
we should expect wealth gains to be
sustainable in the future. But if all the
gain was due to good luck, we must
reduce our consumption relative to our
incomes if we want our wealth to
continue to grow over the long run.
What we save can be mea-
sured as the resources we, as a society,
put toward the future — the labor and
capital devoted to new investment
rather than immediate consumption.
But investing is often risky: an invest-
ment sometimes returns a multiple of
the original investment, but sometimes
much less. When estimating GDP , we
can calculate investment by measuring
how much we invested or by measuring
the outcome of the investment, that is,
the net wealth generated.
Recently, in fact, the dot-com
bubble gave us an object lesson in the
difference between resources invested
and wealth created, since much of the
investment made in this sector has come
to naught. This outcome is, unfortu-
nately, all too typical when we try to
create new products. The risk intrinsic
to investing in new products means that
the outcome of the investment and the
dollars invested are very likely to be
different.
Intangible assets are primarily
derived from the property rights to
which firms become entitled when they
create new goods and services. We can
use the analogy of cooking to divide
economic activities into the creation of
new menu items (creating recipes) and
the actual production of food ready for
the diner (following recipes). Intangible
investment is the creation of recipes,
and the intangible asset created — the
result of the recipe — is the patent,
copyright, trade secret, or brand name
that protects the creator’s right to
exclusively reproduce or use the recipe.
When a private corporation uses this
right to sell new items, it can charge a
monopoly price to consumers, and thus
— if the new item is highly desirable —
earn outsize profits on these assets,
profits that repay the cost of creating the
item. In turn, once private investors
recognize the value of the creation, the
corporation’s stock-market value will
rise, causing its shareholders’ wealth to
increase.
Even if we include the effects
of the recent downturn in the stock
market, in the past two decades, the
wealth of U.S. households has increased
dramatically, and much of this increase
has taken the form of these stock-
market capital gains due to successful
investments in intangible assets.
Taking account of this
investment has become more pressing
because investment in intangible assets
has become a bigger part of the U.S.
economy. In the past, most business
investment took the form of tangibles:
equipment such as trucks, computers,
and typewriters; and structures such as
office buildings, shopping malls, and
homes. But in the past 20 years,
accelerating investment in intangibles
— investments that result in patented
discoveries like Viagra and Celebrex or
copyright-protected products such as
Windows2000, Pentium, and Harry
6 I argue this case in my working paper, “What
Is the U.S. Investment in Intangibles?  (At
Least) One Trillion Dollars a Year!”
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Potter — has increasingly driven U.S.
firms and raised their economic value.
However, investing in intangibles is
much riskier than investing in tangibles.
And taking that riskiness into account is
not easy.
There are two different
approaches we can take: measuring
outcomes or measuring more intangible
investment. And each approach gives us
a different answer.
If we measure outcomes, we
ought to include stock-market capital
gains as part of income. This gives us a
measure that is useful in tracking
wealth. However, including these
capital gains in our definition of income
makes income much more volatile than
other measures of economic activity,
such as employment.7 Also, if we
include capital gains in income, the
personal saving rate, on average, would
have been much higher over the 1990s,
but also more volatile.
An alternative is to include
more intangible investment as measured
by the cost of the inputs — the resources
used in this investment — rather than
counting capital gains, which are a
measure of the success of the invest-
ment. If we adopted this approach,
measured corporate retained earnings
and private gross saving would be larger,





entails a fundamental issue: how to
avoid double-counting it. For example,
when a consumer buys two scrambled
eggs at a diner, we count the tab as part
of output. We don’t want to count
separately the feed that the hen ate
because the cost of feed is part of what
the consumer paid for. The feed is an
intermediate output used in producing
the final output, scrambled eggs.
This same rationale might be
used to exclude saving and investment
from measures of national income. We
could treat investments as intermediate
goods because ultimately they are also
incorporated into final consumption
goods. After all, a truck’s value to
consumption derives from its role in
production: hauling goods that are
ultimately consumed. Similarly, without
a stove, a short order cook can’t make
scrambled eggs.
Two Good Reasons for
Counting Investment as Part of
Output. But one reason we may wish to
count investment as part of output is
that we could have used the resources
that went into investment to simply
increase consumption today. By its very
nature, investment takes resources that
might otherwise have been consumed to
create a product whose value will only
be fully realized over time. If we fail to
include investment as part of output, we
undercount the potential productivity of
our existing resources and omit the
opportunity cost of the investment, that
is, what else we could have done with
our inputs.
A second reason for counting
investment as part of output is that it
represents a store of value. Investing in a
truck or stove is valuable because these
items can be used to help us create more
consumables in the future. By counting
these investments as part of output, we
recognize that when investments
succeed, our wealth increases. Our
wealth, in turn, will enable us to
consume more in the future. Not
counting additions to wealth ignores the
future output that this wealth could
produce.
But Intangibles Have Not
Been Counted. Historically, in the U.S.
national income accounts, only tangible
investments in equipment and struc-
tures have been included in our
measures of investment. Until very
recently, investment in intangibles has
been ignored. Intangibles have tradition-
ally been treated just as if they are
intermediate goods and services that
need not be counted because they are
subsequently incorporated into final
goods and services. But because
intangible investment uses resources to
create products whose value is not
immediately realized, failing to count it
understates both our current ability to
produce and our assets. When we
incompletely count assets whose purpose
is to increase future production, we will
be surprised by the extra income earned
subsequent to the investment, and
profits will grow faster than anticipated.
Beginning in 1998, the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) has
included software as the first intangible
investment in its measure of GDP .
Between 1998 and 2000, measured
7 
Some of this volatility reflects fundamental
volatility in the economy, while some of it
reflects uninformative noise. Disentangling
the two sources of volatility is very difficult,
particularly over short periods.
8 
Total national gross saving includes personal
saving, corporate gross saving, and govern-
ment saving. Corporate gross saving includes
retained earnings and depreciation allow-
ances. As we include more intangibles in
gross investment, both measured retained
earnings and depreciation allowances will
rise. Only when dividends rise (shifting
saving from the corporate sector to private
households) to fully reflect increases in
corporate profits will the personal saving rate
return to its longer run average.
By its very nature, investment takes
resources that might otherwise have been
consumed to create a product whose value will
only be fully realized over time.30   Q4 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
business investment in software rose
from $140 billion to $183 billion, in
current dollars.
Other investments in intan-
gible assets, such as research and
development (R&D), movie and book
production, designs and blueprints, and
the advertising associated with the new
products produced, could also be
included in output. Because these are
important sources of wealth creation, it
seems likely that the BEA will eventu-
ally do so. In the meantime, official
statistics in the United States will






between tangibles and intangibles is that
the production process for tangibles is
much less risky than that for intangibles.
When a truck or an oven is produced,
the outcome — and its value — are
highly predictable. Mass production, by
its very nature, churns out multiple,
identical copies of the same product. If a
firm spends $10 million to equip a
factory, the value of that equipment is
relatively easy to document.
Mass-produced equipment
often has a second-hand market in
which the value of the used equipment
can be determined. Indeed, in some
cases, such as cars and trucks, standard
estimates of the value of  “pre-owned”
equipment are published. Moreover,
accountants and auditors can verify the
existence of the asset. If the equipment
loses its value in the second-hand
market, and the purpose for which the
equipment was bought turns out to be
worthless, the accountant is supposed to
write off the investment, deducting it as
an expense.
When firms invest in intan-
gibles, on the other hand, the product of
the investment is unique and often hard
to evaluate objectively. In fact, the
product often turns out to be worthless.
When a firm invests in producing a
design, a movie, or a drug, it hopes to
end up with something sufficiently
original so that it will have, at least for a
time, a monopoly of some segment of
the market. For the monopoly to have
substantial value, the intangible asset
must offer something no other product
on the market offers.
But efforts to produce what no
one has been able to make before often
misfire. For example, many drugs that
are promising in theory and that work
well in the laboratory or on animals turn
out to be unsafe or ineffective for
human patients in clinical trials. Other
drugs turn out to be worth tens of
billions of dollars. A large pharmaceuti-
cal company may have dozens of drugs
in its development pipeline. Generally,
less than one in 10 will earn back more
than its cost, but that one success may
well justify all the failures and make a
company’s overall research program a
success.
Frederic Scherer and Dietmar
Harhoff’s research on patents issued in
the United States and Germany showed
that the most valuable 10 percent of
patents accounted for between 81
percent and 93 percent of the total
value of the sets of patents studied.9  In
their sample of 772 German patents, for
instance, the top five — less than 1
percent — accounted for 54 percent of
the value of the pool. Thus, a dispropor-
tionate part of the value of all projects is
included in a few successful projects.10
A firm making a $10 million
investment in each of 10 new products
may wind up with an asset worth
nothing nine times out of 10, but the
tenth time may produce an asset worth
$100 million. Realizing the long odds
against success in intangible investment,
accountants have opted to write off
intangible investments — acting as if
they were intermediate products that
did not result in wealth creation. And if
the samples in Scherer and Harhoff’s
study are a good guide, writing off the
investment will be the right thing to do
in most instances. But the right thing to
do most of the time is, on average, the
wrong thing to do. Why? Because the
few investments in intangibles that do
succeed may well be worth more than
all other investments put together. In the
example above, the firm’s 10 investments
turn out to be — in all — worth $100
million. So if the firm had written off
none of its investments, it would have
much more accurately represented its
total investment than if it had written
off nine out of the 10 – or 10 out of 10,
as is current practice.
A Successful Investment in
Intangibles: An Example from
Pharmaceuticals. As an alternative to
current practice, what about measuring
inputs? Consider a pharmaceutical
company that does research to discover
a drug that will cure a previously
9 The studies that Scherer and Harhoff
survey include corporate patents, university
patents, and pharmaceutical patents.
A substantial difference between tangibles and
intangibles is that the production process for
tangibles is much less risky than that for
intangibles.
10 Technically speaking, these sorts of risks are
said to have highly skewed probability
distributions.  Business Review  Q4 2001   31 www.phil.frb.org
incurable disease. For example, in June
2000, Eli Lilly announced its belief that
Xigris, its treatment for septic shock,
would pass its final trials and that its
application to the Food and Drug
Administration would be successful.11
Test results indicated that Xigris would
save perhaps 20,000 lives annually and
earn Eli Lilly as much as $1 to $2 billion
annually in profits over the next decade.
Eli Lilly’s expenditures on
Xigris — including the research that
went into discovering its use as a
treatment for septic shock, the clinical
trials to establish the safety and efficacy
of the treatment, and efforts to publicize
and market the drug to doctors and
medical systems around the world —
are investments that will bear fruit in the
form of substantial profits over an
extended period.
However, our national
accounts don’t include these expendi-
tures as investments. Instead, these
expenditures are treated as expenses —
as if they were part of the inputs into
products Eli Lilly is currently selling. To
draw a parallel, consider two other types
of expenditures Lilly might make. One is
the purchase of equipment for mass
producing a drug. This equipment is
considered an investment because it will
continue to produce output well after
the year of its purchase. Another type of
expenditure is the purchase of ascorbic
acid, which will be used in a chemical
process to make a particular drug. The
ascorbic acid will be almost completely
used in the year it is purchased, and it is
one of the costs that Lilly rightly
expenses in making that particular drug.
Similarly, by calling research and
development an expense, we are in
effect saying that when the R&D is
finished, Eli Lilly doesn’t possess a
valuable asset. And that is surely not the
case.12
On the day Eli Lilly an-
nounced the likely success of its drug
(no previous septic shock treatment had
been successful), its stock-market value
went up $16 billion. Will Xigris’ profits
justify this increase in value? Given the
size of the potential market for the drug
and the number of lives it could save,
analysts who follow Lilly judged that this
single product could well be worth $10
billion or more.
However, Lilly did not invest
$16 billion to produce Xigris. Indeed,
from 1980 to 1999, Lilly’s entire R&D
budget, not adjusted for inflation, was
$15.1 billion; carried forward to 2000,
this investment had a present value of
about $40 billion. Because of its unusual
success, Xigris alone could justify much
of Eli Lilly’s R&D investment for the
previous two decades.13
This example demonstrates
that from the perspective of reporting to
shareholders, as well as for internal
corporate operations, there should be a
strong presumption against the prema-
ture expensing of intangible investments
because doing so understates the
profitability of current operations. For
example, a corporation might capitalize
and depreciate intangible assets
according to a predetermined schedule,
just as it would a tangible investment.
Only when it’s clear that a whole group
of intangible investments has failed
would the corporation write them off as
an expense.
Furthermore, this example
shows that the resources that go into a
risky intangible investment rarely equal
its product. The economic resources
used in producing an intangible asset
will rarely even approximately equal the
market valuation of the results of the
new product development.
By contrast, in a mass-
production economy, input almost
always equals output. That is, any given
12 This represents a fundamental problem in
accounting for investment in intangible
assets, one probably not entirely solvable
using standard accounting treatment of
investment. Tangible investments are
capitalized, then depreciated. That is, when
the expense is first incurred, it is charged to
the capital account and not deducted from
current revenues. Then, over time, as the
tangible asset declines in value, the
depreciation is subtracted from current
revenues, or expensed. By contrast, since
accountants don’t want to include as
investment assets that cannot be concretely
evaluated, intangible assets are expensed
when incurred, rather than over time. As
corporate investment shifts away from
tangibles toward intangibles, current profits
become understated. See my 1999 Business
Review article.
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Another important difference between tangible
and intangible investing is that the firm that
makes tangible capital goods is typically
different from the firm that will use them.
11 Specifically, Eli Lilly released an announce-
ment that the trial would be closed to new
patients earlier than planned.
13 In addition to Xigris, Eli Lilly’s research has
also produced Prozac, an antidepressant, and
Zyprexa, a treatment for schizophrenia, whose
market values were even greater than that of
Xigris. As we went to press in October 2001,
the Food & Drug Administration had not yet
approved Xigris for sale. In measuring Lilly’s
investment in developing new products, it is
not obvious that failures should be written off,
since the successful few were expected to
make up for these losses. Certainly Lilly’s
intangible assets are greater than its total
R&D investments. And on average, accoun-
tants have found that R&D expenditures
result in future profits that justify these
investments (see the articles by Dennis
Chambers, Ross Jennings, and Robert
Thompson.; Baruch Lev and Theodore
Sougiannis; and Doron Nissim and Jacob
Thomas).32   Q4 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
input will almost certainly result in a
salable product. As production of
intangible assets becomes a more
important part of the U.S. economy, this
tight, contemporaneous relationship
between input and output weakens.
Whether any given input will lead to a
salable output becomes difficult to
predict for individual firms.14
Intangible Investments:
Hard to Measure, But Not Impos-
sible. Another important difference
between tangible and intangible
investing is that the firm that makes
tangible capital goods is typically
different from the firm that will use
them. For example, the firm that will use
— that is, invest in — computers will
generally buy them from another firm
rather than making them itself. This
makes the investment highly visible: a
transaction has occurred, and money
has changed hands to attest to the
investment’s value.
which proportion of these expenditures
result in the creation of an intangible
asset.
There are cases in which the
intangible investment yields a salable
asset. When Chrysler designs a new car,
or Eli Lilly develops a new drug, or J.K.
Rowling writes a new Harry Potter
novel, the design, or the drug, or the
novel is a product that could be sold to
the highest bidder for a fixed sum.
Indeed, this sometimes happens. A
design firm such as Pininfarina can
design a car for a manufacturer; a small
biotech start-up may sell a new drug to a
major pharmaceutical company; and a
writer may be commissioned to ghost
write a book.  In these cases, there is no
real problem in classifying each of the
sales as either income or output.
But with intangible assets it’s
more difficult. Most of the time, there is
no direct transaction to tell us what the
intangible asset is worth. Transactions
that do tell us about the value of
intangible assets are capital transactions:
the buying and selling of the equity
shares of firms that have invested in and
produced the intangible assets. So our
only way to measure the success of the
vast majority of investment in intangible
assets is changes in the stock-market





Are there practical ways to
measure the major inputs that go into
producing intangible assets?  If there are,
and if most of our investment outcomes
are the result of such inputs, we will,
over the long run, account for most
wealth creation without the sharp ups
and downs of the stock market overly
influencing our statistics.  We do have
reasonably good measures of investment
in R&D, advertising, and software. But
the discussion in this section underscores
the difficulties in measuring production
of most intangible assets, and the
14 Output and employment are also closely
associated in mass-production economies —
so much so that economic forecasters have
summarized the relationship in Okun’s law. A
recent formulation of Okun’s law states that a
decline of 2 percent in real output will be
reflected in an increase in unemployment of 1
percentage point. (See the article by Glenn
Rudebusch.) This relationship would not hold
if income included capital gains.
By contrast, intangible
investment is generally done in-house:
Intel’s chips are designed by its engi-
neers, Microsoft’s software is designed by
its programmers, and Eli Lilly’s drugs are
developed by its biochemists. So the
outlay made to create intangibles is
harder to verify.  Moreover, while some
expenses are clearly aimed at creating
intangible assets, other expenses are
harder to determine. For example, it is
difficult to know how much of a chief
executive’s time is devoted to producing
intangibles and how much to coordinat-
ing production.
But it is not impossible. Some
corporations attempt to allocate
expenses to current production or to
future projects. Such corporations
require their employees to report work
hours on a project-by-project basis.
These projects can be classified into
those that contribute to current
production and those that produce
intangible assets. Thus, it might be
possible for a corporation to divide
money spent on sales and general and
administrative needs into expenses for
current production and intangible asset
production. Doing so might well provide
a corporation with a measure of the
resources that go into intangible
investment that would be of substantial
value to its shareholders. If this practice
became widespread, statistical analysis
would then be possible to evaluate  Business Review  Q4 2001   33 www.phil.frb.org
estimates noted are generally conserva-
tive estimates of investments in intan-
gibles.
Consider the various input
costs that go into making a new good
available to consumers.  In the case of a
prescription drug, a disease must first be
targeted, and an approach to its control
or cure must be established.  Then a
chemical compound must be discovered
or constructed that effects the required
control or cure. Next, the chemical
compound must undergo animal trials,
then human clinical trials. Initial clinical
trials establish that the compound is safe
and effective. A third round of clinical
trials involving large numbers of patients
and doctors must determine the range
of symptoms for which the drug is
effective and the appropriate dosages.
These data must be presented to the
Food and Drug Administration for
approval; a process for mass production
for the compound must be designed;
and teams of sales personnel must
instruct doctors and nurses around the
world in the use of the compound. The
company may further directly inform
patients through print or broadcast
media advertising.
Costs of research and develop-
ment, administration, marketing, and
media advertising all enter into the
intangible investment. The firm making
these investments must believe that
these fixed costs will at least be repaid,
on average, by the returns to successful
intangible assets.
Research and Development.
According to National Science
Foundation estimates, in 2000, U.S.
corporations spent $181 billion of their
own funds on R&D. This expenditure
represented 3.3 percent of the gross
domestic product of nonfinancial
corporations and 1.8 percent of total
GDP . 15 By contrast, in 1978, such
corporate R&D expenditures were 1.8
percent of nonfinancial corporate GDP
and 1 percent of aggregate GDP . Both of
these figures probably underestimate
R&D expenditures. Firms that invest in
R&D typically have to make additional
expenditures to support product
development, including marketing,
consumer testing, and executive
decision making, that are not part of the
engineering and scientific expenses that
account for most of what the National
Science Foundation calls research and
development.
Advertising.  According to
advertising agency McCann-Erickson,
firms spent $233 billion on advertising in
2000. This expenditure represents 2.3
percent of GDP , up from 1.9 percent in
1978. However, McCann-Erickson’s data
reflect the market for advertising
agencies; they do not include many
other marketing expenses that firms
incur, such as the sales forces of
pharmaceutical companies or fees paid
to public relations firms and athletes —
marketing expenses that have been
rising faster than agency fees. To the
extent that firms spend this money to
inform consumers about new products,
advertising and marketing expenditures
should be counted as investments in
intangible assets because the informa-
tion supplied to consumers through
these avenues will generate profits over
a sustained period.
Software.  One area in which
the national income accounts have
come to grips with measuring invest-
ment in intangibles is software. Accord-
ing to the BEA, in 2000, private
businesses invested $183 billion in
software, or 1.8 percent of GDP ,
compared with 0.3 percent in 1978.
This software investment comes in three
types: prepackaged software; custom
software; and own-account software.
Prepackaged software ($61.4
billion in 2000) is sold at arm’s length,
that is, the company that invests in the
software is different from the company
that makes it. Sales of prepackaged
software to consumers have always been
counted as consumer expenditures. But
such sales to firms were counted as
expenses, not investment, until the BEA
changed its method in 1998. Note that
as part of the investment in new
software, firms must also train their
employees in the use of the software.16
Thus, purchases of software underesti-
mate the total resources firms must
allocate when they invest in new
software.
The software investments of
firms that purchase prepackaged
software do not include the intangible
investments made by the producers of
15 In addition, the National Science
Foundation estimates that governments in
the U.S., mainly the federal government,
spent $72 billion on research and develop-
ment in 2000, while universities, colleges,
and other nonprofit organizations spent an
additional $12 billion.  In all, $265 billion is
estimated to have been spent on research and
development, or roughly 2.6 percent of
aggregate U.S. GDP . Expenditures by private
industry are counted here because all of this
expenditure has as its purpose the creation of
private intangible assets. Moreover, the
public expenditure on research and
development is already included in gross
domestic product as part of government
expenditures.  It is also the case, however,
that, increasingly, universities, colleges, and
other organizations and individuals take
advantage of research sponsored by the
federal government or nonprofits to license
new product development, thereby creating
intangible assets.
16 This point was emphasized by Shinkyu Yang
and Erik Brynjolfson.
[Prepackaged software] sales to firms were
counted as expenses, not investment, until
the BEA changed its method in 1998.34   Q4 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
the software. A company’s investment
in creating software is separate from the
purchasing company’s investment in
software. For example, Microsoft’s
investments in producing the Windows
operating system and in the Microsoft
Office suite of products are separate
from the investments that corporations
make when they buy these programs.
Microsoft’s value as an ongoing concern
resides primarily in the intellectual
property rights it holds for the software it
has created and is separate from the
value created by other firms’ invest-
ments to acquire licenses to use
Microsoft Windows and Microsoft
Office.
Custom software is also
purchased, but like custom clothing, it is
uniquely adapted for the buyer ($57
billion in 2000). In some of these cases,
the rights to the software are sold to the
buyer. In other cases, a substantial
proportion of the software rights remain
with the software producer. When
property rights remain with the pro-
ducer, custom software sales data may
understate the value of the producer’s
investment.
Own-account software is made
by employees of the user ($64 billion in
2000). To measure investment in own-
account software, the BEA examines
how many programmers are employed at
firms that don’t sell software and
estimates how much of their work goes
into developing new software (invest-
ment) versus maintenance and repair of
existing software (expense).  The most
recent study of this division, which was
published in 1982, found that 62 percent
of programmers’ time was spent on
creating new programs.17 The BEA
estimates that since then, programmers
have become more involved in repair
and maintenance. Therefore, the BEA
counts 50 percent of programmers’ time
as new software investment, a figure it
describes as underscoring the arbitrari-
ness of such measures.
Other Industries’ Data Are
Sparser. Expenditures on R&D,
advertising, and software do not
exhaust, by any means, firms’ expendi-
tures on intangibles. For example, most
financial corporations do not report their
expenditures to develop new products as
R&D expenses. Yet financial corpora-
tions have been making a large and
growing investment in financial
innovations, including investment
vehicles like derivatives and mutual
funds, electronic payment systems,
ATMs, and credit and debit cards. They
have also invested large sums in
customer databases and in customer
relationships associated with these new
instruments.
Almost no data are collected
on financial corporations’ expenditures
on intangibles.18  However, financial
corporations’ noninterest expenditures
have been rising rapidly. For example, in
2000, noninterest expenditures for
commercial banks were $215.5 billion, or
2.1 percent of GDP , up from 1.6 percent
of GDP in 1978. Noninterest expendi-
tures include commercial banks’
innovations and marketing expenses,
but they are only an indicator of banks’
investment in intangibles because they
also include expenditures for tellers and
bank branches. The market value of
financial institutions has recently
averaged more than 20 percent of the
market value of nonfinancial corpora-
tions, compared with around 11 percent
in 1978. If financial corporations spend
proportionally as much on R&D as
nonfinancial corporations report
spending, this would add another $50
billion to R&D. Commercial banks alone
have added more than $50 billion in
noninterest expenditures in this same
period. And that neglects the innovative
expenditures of mutual funds, insurance
companies, real estate firms, other
depositories, or investment banks.
Writers, artists, and entertain-
ers make additional investments in
intangibles, and these investments are
not recorded as part of R&D. In 1997,
according to the U.S. economic census,
the publishing, motion picture, and
sound recording industries had a total
revenue of $221 billion. Associated with
this stream of revenues are investments
in creativity and in finding, developing,
and publicizing artists and their work.19
Much of the investment in
movies, television, and other media pays
off quickly because it shows up in
movie-theater ticket sales or videotape
rentals. Other programming costs, such
as many television network broadcasts,
are paid for by advertising. However, as
Richard Caves points out, television
series are produced at a loss — the
network’s payment for first broadcast
rights does not cover the production
costs of the series. What producers hope
for is that the series will run long enough
(three to five seasons has usually been
17 Thus this study comes from the era before
the widespread use of personal computers and
computer networks.
18 See the article by Bob Hunt.
During the earlier period of relatively high
saving rates, Americans did not become rich,
and as measured saving fell during the 1990s,
Americans’ wealth increased dramatically.
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the minimum) so that reruns can be
profitably syndicated. Syndication will
sometimes pay substantially more than
the initial broadcast rights. Similarly, a
movie series like “Star Wars” can
become a multibillion dollar property,
since sequels, video games, toys, and
clothes based on the series can be sold.
All told, it can be argued that
when the inputs that make up intan-
gible investment are measured more
accurately, domestic U.S. corporations’
investment in intangibles is likely in the
range of $700 billion to $1.5 trillion.20
STOCK-MARKET CAPITAL
GAINS: USING OUTCOMES TO
MEASURE INCOME
The official measures of
household income include dividend
payments but not stock-market capital
gains. The measured personal saving
rate is low because stock-market capital
gains are high and dividends are low.
Personal saving in the United States was
low throughout the 1990s, but the net
worth of Americans increased from $20
trillion to $41 trillion from the end of
1989 to the end of 2000. Adjusting for
inflation, this figure represents a real
increase, in 1996 dollars, of $14 trillion
(from $24 trillion to $38 trillion).21
During the three decades before 1990,
the U.S. personal saving rate (the ratio
of personal saving to disposable personal
income) averaged 9 percent. From 1952
to 1989, the annual personal saving rate
never fell below 6.9 percent (Figure).
By contrast, in the 1990s, the
saving rate averaged much less, 6
percent, and fell during the course of
the decade, from 7.8 percent in 1990 to
2.4 percent in 1999. In 2000, it was 1
percent.
But during the earlier period of
relatively high saving rates, Americans
did not become rich, and as measured
saving fell during the 1990s, Americans’
wealth increased dramatically. This
puzzle remains whether we measure
savings and wealth in nominal terms or
in real terms.22
During the 1960s and 1970s,
stock-market capital gains were 0.4
percent of GDP . During the 1980s they
were 3.7 percent of GDP , and in the
1990s, 16.0 percent.23 If we use these
averages over decades to smooth
growth, then from the 1970s to 1980s,
the nominal and real growth of the
economy, including stock-market capital
gains, may have been 0.3 percent higher
than reported, and from the 1980s to the
1990s, about 1.2 percent higher.24
If we attribute this rate of
capital gains to intangible investment,
FIGURE
Saving and Wealth
Personal Saving Rate (%)
Household Net Worth as Ratio to
Disposable Income (%)
20 Further discussion of a variety of data that
suggest this is in my working paper.
21 Specifically, we’ve used the GDP deflator to
eliminate the effects of inflation.
22 In nominal terms, during the three decades
before 1990, the net worth of American
households as a proportion of after-tax income
actually fell slightly, from 504 percent to 493.
So with the lower saving rate of the 1990s, we
might have expected a still lower net worth.
Instead, net worth rose to 620 percent of
after-tax income at the end of 1999, before
falling to 579 by the end of 2000. Alterna-
tively, in real terms, net worth, measured in
1996 dollars, rose from $8.4 trillion at the end
of 1959 to $23.4 trillion at the end of 1989 —
a $15.0 trillion increase over 30 years and a
compound annual growth rate of  3.5 percent.
By the end of 1999, net worth rose to $38.1
trillion — a $14.7 trillion increase in just 10
years and a compound annual growth rate of
4.8 percent. Thus, whether we compare
increases in wealth with nominal incomes or
with consumer price inflation, households’
wealth grew more rapidly in the 1990s than in
previous decades.
23 From the end of 1959 to the end of 1979,
capital gains on equities of domestic
corporations, according to the Flow of Funds
accounts, averaged just $12.8 billion a year in
1996 dollars, while real GDP averaged $3.6
trillion. From the end of 1979 to the end of
1989, yearly stock-market capital gains
averaged $209 billion while real GDP
averaged $5.6 trillion. From the end of 1989 to
the end of 1999, annual stock-market capital
gains averaged $1.2 trillion while real GDP
averaged $7.6 trillion.
24 Thus, if we add capital gains to output,
much of the productivity slowdown after the
mid-1970s may disappear.36   Q4 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
intangible investment must have been
quite large. As measured by inputs,
investments in intangibles add up to $1
trillion a year.25 If so, this can help
explain why capital gains have been so
large.
Some Consequences of
Excluding Capital Gains. Excluding
capital gains from our measures of
household and national income has
several disquieting consequences. First,
the household saving rate is very low
and likely to remain so as long as stock-
market capital gains remain strong.
Since these capital gains are founded on
very large investments in intangible
assets, there is little reason to think they
will not continue, on average. Of course,
volatility will continue, as the recent
stock-market downturn reminds us.
Second, if stock options
continue to rise in importance as a form
of reward to employees, employee
compensation will increasingly depend,
at least in part, on stock-market capital
gains.  This compensation can be
measured in terms of the market value
of the option when issued or in terms of
the realized value of the option when it’s
exercised. How to properly measure this
compensation in our accounts is a
question that is yet unanswered. At
present, most employee stock options are
included in personal income when they
are exercised, not when they are
granted.  Recently, personal income for
2000 was revised upward, in part
because the amount of stock options
exercised was larger than initially
anticipated. As a result, measured
personal saving rose from a negative to a
low positive number.
Third, when stock options are
exercised or when stocks are sold and
capital gains are realized, tax obligations
are accrued. These capital gains taxes
have been an important element of the
surge in personal income tax payments
in the late 1990s that has continued into
the new millennium. As a consequence,
tax payments as a proportion of mea-
sured household income have risen.
Thus, even if we ignore capital gains in
our income and compensation measures,
they have an important impact on
government finance and measured
household saving, since increased
personal tax payments raise government
saving and lower household saving.
Finally, the income of financial
intermediaries often feeds off capital
gains. For example, firms that manage
investment funds often earn a propor-
tion of the capital gains they accrue on
behalf of clients, and an investment
bank may make a substantial fraction of
its income from capital gains.  How to
include such earnings in the national
accounts is not easily determined, but
since such corporations account for a
fifth of all stock-market equity, they are
an important part of the economy.
CONCLUSION
Changes in the U.S. economy
have made U.S. economic develop-
ments inherently more difficult to
analyze. In particular, production
becomes riskier as more of our efforts are
devoted to producing intangible assets.
Measuring this effort is hard, and
measuring its outcome is even harder.
Yet making the effort to measure these
investments is surely preferable to
ignoring them, even though the
outcome is not entirely satisfactory.
If we were to include increases
in households’ net worth in GDP , the
variability of these capital gains would
overwhelm that of the rest of income. In
1999, real household net worth rose by
$4 trillion (in 1996 dollars); in 2000 it fell
about $2 trillion. Since real GDP was
roughly $9 trillion in 1999, real GDP
including these capital gains was about
$13 trillion; in 2000, it tumbled to $7
trillion.26  Thus GDP growth measured
this way was negative by more than 40
percent!  That decline is the amount we
would generally associate with an
economic catastrophe like the Great
Depression. Yet the unemployment rate
scarcely changed between 1999 and
2000; in fact, it fell slightly from an
average of 4.2 percent to 4.0 percent.
It may well turn out that
excluding capital gains from our
measures of national income and living
with a spuriously low personal saving
rate may be the best alternative.
However, we might wish to add another
measure of household income and
saving that does include capital gains.
Indeed, we might want to have one
measure that includes capital gains that
have been realized, that is, where the
investor has taken the profit by actually
selling the stock, and another one that
includes all stock-market capital gains,
realized and unrealized.
It may not be possible to use a
single standard of GDP as our sole
measure of U.S. economic progress.
Nevertheless, we should continue to
improve our measures of GDP . The BEA
has taken an important step by includ-
ing software investment in GDP . Other
items the BEA should consider in the
future include R&D and advertising.
26 To be more precise, if we use the GDP
deflator to convert net worth into 1996
dollars, in 1999 households’ net worth rose
$4.2 trillion and in 2000 it fell $1.9 trillion. In
1999, real GDP without capital gains was $8.9
trillion, and in 2000 it was $9.2 trillion. Thus,
including capital gains, real GDP was $13.1
trillion in 1999, and $7.3 trillion in 2000, a
decline of 44 percent.
25 For details, see my forthcoming working
paper.
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